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President's Notes 
S orneone asked me recently if I missed the Battle Force job 
in the Mediterranean. The truthful 
answer is that the pace and the excite­
ment in Newport haven't given me 
much opportunity to dwell on what I 
might be missing elsewhere. The 
Naval War College is the center of 
important new Navy initiatives and 
there is a lot going on. It began 
with former CNO Admiral Torn 
Hayward establishing our Strategic Studies Group in July 1981. It continues 
with the formal designation of our War Gaming Center as the prime Navy 
gaming facility. It has reached a crescendo with Admiral Jim Watkins' 
decision to cut back the Navy training pipeline in order to free additional, highly 
qualified officers for duty as students at the Naval War College. 
This is my first "President's Notes," partly because of all this activity, 
partly because I have been away talking to large and small groups of naval 
officers both on East Coast and West Coast trips, perhaps twelve hundred or 
so officers in all. In every case I have been telling them the story of what is 
going on at Newport and how it affects them professionally. I have been 
explaining Admiral Watkins' plans for this institution. 
Those ideas have been promulgated in two Alna vs, one of 22 September 
1982 and the other of 15 November 1982. Translated from goals into concrete 
plans, they resulted in the input of officers into the program in February 1983, 
for the first "post-command short course" of six weeks duration. This "short 
course" was specifically designed to get us off to a fast start. Three more such 
six-week courses are planned for the rest of this calendar year. Meanwhile, 
inputs into the full, 10-rnonth course of post-commanders are being increased 
systematically. 
The students being sent to the short course, as the name suggests, are 
officers who have just completed a successful tour in a command position. 
They are given an intensive course which focuses on naval operations 
with some admixture of strategy and defense decision-making. Within the 
naval operations portion, heavy stress is put on war gaming, the practical 
application phase. 
A subset of the full academic year, the senior naval operations course, 
which the successful post-commanders will take in increasing numbers, has 
been carefully overhauled to do two things: to increase its emphasis on 
viewing operational problems consistently from a four-star or joint or 
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4 
Surface Ship Survivability: 
An Enduring Issue 
by 
Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld, US Navy (Retired) 
A recurring theme in naval debate since the mid-19th century has been 
.nthe vulnerability of warships in the face of the threats posed by new 
weapons. In their day Sinope, Hampton Roads, Lissa, Tsushima, and Jutland 
focused the attention of the public, as well as professional opinion, on the 
subject. World War II and the development of nuclear weapons rekindled 
this interest. From a historical perspective this interest appears to have been 
most keen during a conflict following an extended period of peace during 
which there was rapid development in naval weapons technology. Against 
this background, the quest for "lessons learned"-or relearned-from the 
Falkland episode of last year should not come as a surprise. 
Ship sinking, in combat are dramatic events that capture the public 
imagination. Such sinking,, as during the Falkland campaign, are particularly 
dramatic to a public with a foreshortened historical perspective. The 
vulnerability of naval and sea lift forces to air and submarine attack would not 
have surprised those sailors who journeyed to Malta, Murmansk, or Okinawa 
some forty years ago. Similarly, the capabilities of naval forces to isolate a 
battlefield or interrupt its lines of communication would not have surprised 
the sailors. soldiers, and marines on either side of Bataan, Singapore, Saipan, 
or Inchon. Although surprises may be few for the professional observer with 
a longer perspective of the development of naval warfare, that is not to say 
that a fundamental shift in the balance of ship vulnerability has not occurred 
since the last major con!lict-even if one puts nuclear weapons effects aside. 
Since recent data points are few, the Falkland experience offers a timely 
opportunity to review the ell.during issue of surface ship survivability. 
Survivability is not simply a question of proper ship construction, the 
effectiveness of the installed weapons, and damage control training. 
Survivability is critically related to the mission given to the ship in a 
particular situation and to her tactical employment in conjunction with other 
weapons. For example, the mission given the ship may not be the one for 
which she was built. Sailors,just as soldiers and airmen, must fight with what 
they have. In other cases a ship may be given a mission for which she was 
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14 
The Ultimate Trust: National 
Self-Restraint as a Factor in War 
by 
Colonel Theodore L. Gatchel, US Marine Corps 
An anti-nuclear movement appears to be raking America by storm. (n a 
.l'1. short time, the movement progressed from resolutions at New
England town meetings and demonstrations at the launchings of nuclear 
submarines to the point where it is influencing national policy makers, if not 
national policy. Over a year ago seventeen US senators and more than one 
hundred members of the House of Representatives called upon the Reagan 
administration to negotiate a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union, for 
example, and about the same time four nationally known policy makers from 
previous administrations published an article recommending that the United 
States declare a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons ln Europe. 1 Even 
Admiral Rickover, father of the nuclear submarine, and Dr. Samuel Cohen, 
Rickover's counterpart with respect to the neutron bomb, have recently 
expressed second thoughts regarding the wisdom of employing the weapons 
they worked so hard to create.2 
The nature of this anti-nuclear movement is so diverse that it defies 
accurate definition. The individuals involved include pacifists and others 
who oppose nuclear weapons on moral grounds; radicals searching for a 
chance to discomfit the United States; and serious strategic thinkers who 
believe that reliance on nuclear deterrence, the effectiveness of which is 
uncertain at best. is a shaky foundation on which to rest our nation's security. 
In spite of the great diversity of motivation. several common themes seem to 
unite these individuals, at least loosely. One is the belief that nuclear war is 
both imminent and unsurvivable. The hands of the ominous Doomsday Clock 
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, for example, are closer to the hour of 
doom than they have been since the Cuban missile crisis. The issue of 
survivability has also been discussed in a wide variety of recent articles and 
books, many of which depict any employment of nuclear weapons as leading 
inexorably to the complete destruction of the human race. Another 
characteristic found among many anti-nuclear activists is the reluctance to 
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26 
French Defense Policy 
by 
Steven T. Ross 
S peaking at the Ecole Militaire on 3 November 1959, President Charles 
de Gaulle said that the Fifth Republic "had as its raison d'etre ... the 
defense of the nation's independence and integrity. It is necessary that the 
defense of France be French." He went on to explain that while the Republic 
remained loyal to the Atlantic alliance the nation would not place life or 
death decisions in the hands of others. States had the right and the obligation 
to exercise sovereign choice in matters of vital· national interest. 
De Gaulle realized that in order to restore French status as a major power 
he would have to end the Algerian war and complete decolonialization, The 
requirements of colonial warfare had drastically limited the Fourth 
Republic's diplomatic and military options. Determined to escape from this 
trap, de Gaulle moved quickly to conclude the conflict in Algeria and granted 
independence to most French African colonies. 
Simultaneously, he sought to restructure the Atlantic alliance to provide 
France with a larger independent role. In September 1958, he sent a memo to 
President Eisenhower proposing an arrangement wherein the United States, 
Great Britain, and France would coordinate global strategy and nuclear 
policy. At a press conference in 1960, he again advocated that America, 
England, and France take joint decisions on global problems. 
When the Americans rejected his overtures, he turned his attention to an 
effort to reorder bloc politics. He criticized the bipolar global balance as 
dangerous since Americ an-Soviet rivalry automatically transformed local 
issues around the world into major confrontations. He also raised serious 
questions about Washington's resolve to defend Europe, pointing out that as 
Soviet nuclear capability grew there would be growing reluctance on the 
part of American leaders to place their homeland at risk to protect allies. The 
American policy of flexible response was in fact an effort to confine a central 
front war to Europe thus sparing American cities from nuclear destruction. 
De Gaulle's solution was to create a French-led third force in Europe 
which could act as an interlocator between the superpowers. In pursuit of this 
goal he signed a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963 which 
included provisions for regular me etings of the heads of state as well as 
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A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade 
in the Civil War 
by 
William N. Still, Jr.
A navy imposes a blockade in order to isolate the enemy, or some part of 
.l'1.his territory, from the rest of the world. In most wars the side with 
the stronger fleet tries to blockade the other side. Thus, the British Navy has 
blockaded among others, France, the United Stares, Germany, and most 
recently the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands. The United States Navy 
has blockaded Mexico, the Confederacy, the Spanish forces in Cuba, Japan, 
and briefly, North Vietnam. 
Blockade has been hailed by those who have used it, or wish to employ it 
anew for some current conflict; it has been reviled by its victims. When we
look at its results we find that it has been useful. However, it has not always 
had the influence with which it is often credited. The American Civil War in 
1861~1865 is a good example. 
Historians generally agree that the Union navy's major task in the Civil 
War was the establishment and maintenance of the blockade. This was 
determined on 19 April 1861, when Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade 
against the seceded states. His navy's secondary tasks included the protection 
of American foreign commerce and the support of land operations, Both the 
blockade and support of  land operations would necessitate combined 
operations, including amphibious operations, against the Confederate states. 
In his first annual report, for 1861, the Union Secretary of the Navy, Gideon 
Welles, listed these tasks: 
"1. The closing of all the insurgent ports along a coast of nearly three 
thousand miles, in the form and under the exacting regulations of an 
international blockade, including the naval occupation and defense of the 
Potomac River , .. , 
"2. The organization of combined naval and military expeditions to operate in 
force against various points of the southern coast, rendering efficient nava1 
cooperation with the position and movements of such expeditions when landed, 
and including also alt needful naval aid to the army in cutting intercommunication 
with the rebels and in its operation., on the Mississippi and its tributaries; and 
"3. The active pursuit of the piratical cruis,m which might escape the 
vigilance of the blockading force , ... " 
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The Soviet Union 
and the Falklands War 
by 
Vojtech Masmy 
The 1982 conflict between Great Britain and Argentina was the first
 time that a Nato power, other than the United States, tested itself in combat since France had lost the Algerian war twenty years before. The 
campaign in the South Atlantic involved predominantly sea power-the 
element of military might in which the Soviet Union had been investing 
vigorously. A clash between two of America's friends in a region of great 
political instability, the crisis offered apparent opportunities for expansion of 
Soviet influence at the expense of the United States. For both military and 
political reasons, therefore, Moscow was bound to follow the Falklands 
drama with keen interest. 
Like the rest of the world, the Soviet Union was initially caught by surprise 
at the Argentine seizure of the islands on 2 April. The Marxist conceptual 
framework, through which Moscow still tends to interpret world events, 
could not supply a plausible explanation for a conflict between two 
conservative capitalist governments half around the globe away from each 
other, nor could it provide a ready guide for action. As a Soviet journal later 
philosophically observed, this was a "strange war," showing how "unreliable 
and fragile is the peace which exists on earth. "1 The one material stake that 
the Soviet Union had in Argenrina-to insure for itself continued supply of 
Argentine grain-was unlikely to be seriously affected regardless of the 
outcome of the dispute. The initial response of the Soviet Union and its allies 
to the bizarre case of aggression that had taken place in one of the world's 
most remote corners was therefore ambivalent, 
Looking for some plausible, albeit unproven, causes of the conflict, early 
Soviet commentaries dwelt on presumed strategic importance of the islands 
and the supposedly fabulous oil riches hidden underneath the surrounding 
waters,2 In contrast. the Havana television on 7 April made the more 
pertinent comment that Argentina's anti-communist rulers had seized the 
Falklands in a desperate bid for domestic popularity, trying to divert Copyright@ 1983 by Vojtech Mas ny 
48
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
49
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
50
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
51
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
52
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
53
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
54
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
55
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
56
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
57
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
56 
Two Routes to the Wrong Destination: 
Public Affairs in the South Atlantic War 
by 
Lieutenant Commander Arthur A. Humphries, US Navy 
T he conflict in the South Atlantic in mid-1982 between Argentina and 
.I.. Great Britain offers us the opportunity to examine news management
and its effects on public opinion in a crisis. This undeclared limited war for 
the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, also provides us with a classic view of the 
differences in public information policies in an authorita'rian government and 
in a democratic society. My intent is not to discuss the morality of 
propaganda, sophism, or blatant lying by a government in a crisis bur to 
account for its existence and explain why and bow it happens, along with the 
less oblique problems of misinformation and speculation. 
There has been a tendency in the wake of the crisis to compare the public 
affairs or news aspects to America's experiences in the Vietnam conflict. J 
don't think that Vietnam provides an apt comparison. While both Vietnam 
and the Falklands were limited wars, there were too many dissimilarities to 
allow for historical analogy, especially in the area of public information. 
There was a great deal of time for the US Military Assistance Command in 
Vietnam and the government back home to plan and set up facilities for the 
press corps in Vietnam. The news media also had a great deal of time to 
develop attitudes about, and strategies for, approaching that particular crisis. 
There was no such urgency in Vietnam as we saw in the South Atlantic. But 
there was one striking similarity-the capability for immediate mass 
communication. 
Mass Communirntions. There was the potential in the South Atlantic to show 
the folks back home a vivid, real-life, real-time picture of men from two 
opposing nations on two ordinary and theretofore unimportant islands doing 
some very permanent, ugly things to each other. After the Vietnam Tet 
Offensive of 1968, the American public, and for that matter the whole world, 
saw a sample of South Vietnamese-style capital punishment-a real 
execution of an enemy soldier, via their television sets in their own homes. 
That isnot the sort of thing that would engender support at home for a war. If 
you want to maintain popular support for a war, your side mustnot be seen as 
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The Military in the Post-Vietnam Era: 
A Search for Relevance 
by 
Major Lawrence B. Wilkerson, US Army 
"And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night." 
Matthew Arnold During World War II the American military establishment consum­
mated an evolutionary process: it became a contradiction. It
became so in much the same fashion as the ideas of equality and liberty are a 
contradiction: deeply, disturbingly, and disharmonically. Since that tran­
sition period-called by Russell Weigley the passage from "frontier 
constabulary" to userious competitor of European armies long accustomed 
to international contests on a grand scale"-the military establishment has 
searched for a justification, a raison d 'etre. 1 Thus far, it seems, the search has 
produced mixed results, the negative aspects accentuated and exacerbated by 
two uunwon" wars and-with vitiating currency-by the military's 
potential use in places as disparate as the areas of the Arabian littoral and El 
Salvador. The future portends a continued lack of any ultimate success. The 
impact such an agonizing endeavor promises to have on the nation with 
whose security this military establishment is charged-a nation barely two 
hundred years old-could be immense. 
The transition period marked much more than simply a p assage from a 
frontier police force to a global instrument of power, and the period did not 
begin in 1941. It had firm roots in the Great War of 1914-18, or as many 
historians have come to perceive it accurately, in Act One of a two-act drama 
that had an extended intermission. From April 1917 to September 1945, the 
Amerkan military establishment evolved into a contradiction in the 
American polity. After August 1945 the contradiction had become an 
aberration as well. It was an aberration because it possessed ( though it did not 
know quite what to do with) a destructive apparatus that threatened the 
planned extinction of mankind, it was a contradiction because it endeavored 
to perpetuate and indeed to institudonalize the gap between American ideals 
74
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
75
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
76
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
77
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
78
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
79
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
80
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
81
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
83
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
85
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
86
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
87
War College: May & June 1983 Full Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
88
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/32
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Jn conditions of super-power nuclear stand-off we have seen at least two wars and 
many lesser incidents in which 1 by that definition, strategic bombing has been 
successfully employed. For example, and constrained only by political consider­
ations, it was employed against North Korea ln 1950-51. It was again employed with 
conspicuous success against Hauoi and Haiphong in the Linebacker II Offensive of 
December 1974. Cdr. Kerr may not sec that as a strategic attack. but the North 
Vietnamese seem to have done so. A third and particularly interesting example of a 
lower scale strategic attack was the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear fadh ty 
in June 1981. The fact that this raid was made by a small number of aircraft and that 
the two states were not at war by no means disqualifies this precise and highly 
effective raid from the domain of s.trategic attack. The potentiaJ balance of power in 
rhe who1c region may have been shifted by a stnke on a key industrial facility rather 
than by any conventional dash of armies, Perhaps we need a new phrase to describe 
this kind of air bombardment against targets other than super-power key points, and 
( sugge'-t that 'theatre strategic attack' fits the bill. 
We cannot foresee whether this or any other kind of strategic bombing will be 
appropriate to wars in the future; but it is quite certain that neither the hiHory of the 
Second World War nor the limited experience of the Falklands campaign rules it out, 
Air Marshal M. J. Armitage, CBE, RAF 
Warfare in the Fourth Dimension' 
Sir: 
One way to think of electromagnetic warfare is to look at warfare in general as a 
thermodynamic process. The electromagnetic spectrum is used to transmit informa­
tion, and the battle for the airw.1ves is really a comest for control of the flow of 
information. 
Because electromagnetic w:s1ves add, it is impo$sible to actuaHy destroy a signal. 
Bur i clearly, the information content can be destroyed by jamming, This reduces the 
information or increases the entropy, While EW is used to control the flow of 
information in the electromagnetic spectrum, conventJOnal weapons are used to 
create disorder {h1ercase entropy) in an opponent's tactical formations, logistic 
systems, etc, 
The view of warfare as a battle to maximize the information under one's control, 
and to maximize the entropy of an opponent then logically follows, From thh point 
of view, C31 systems are critical in providing an information advantage. The quality 
of our computer and s,1ftware systems becomes critical, because of the multiplier 
effect that rhey produce in the control of information. 
Conversely, an adversary with a sophistic;ite<l electronic warfare capability might 
attack srratcgic targets with a jjsoft kill," This could include disruption of banking, 
electric power distribution, air traffic cotitrol, and similar s.ystems. Actually, this 
could be done in a clandestine manner, so that deniability could be maintained. The 
1 See Lieut. Cdr, G. Guy Thomas, "Warfare in 1he fourth Dimc.nsi<m-ls.the Navy Rudy for it?f-fow 
can the Navy Prepare for it?" in Nrw,1f WM (:.,/leg" R�v1rn,, January-February 1983, pp 16-2.'t 
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PROJFE§§liON AL READING 
jj , • •  though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an
excellent reference work, topnotch for selected reading, and the only 
reasonable historical source , , , for a line officer thrust into destroyer 
modification, procurement or design, .. 
by 
Vice Admiral Thomas R, Weschler, US Navy (Retired)* 
Friedman, Norman, U.S. Destroyers: Au lll•strated Desig11 History. Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1982. 489pp. $46.95
This handsomely jacketed, but soberly covered, large book presents acomplete history of the design and detailed characteristics of every 
destroyer type in the US Navy (covering a period of over 80 years), but it 
does so in too many instances with a labored pedagogic style. This is in 
contrast to a few chapters, less cluttered with such detail, that are alive with 
the interplay between design discussion, final characteristics and wartime or 
Fleet achievements, The author, in his acknowledgement, indicates that a 
suggestion for a book showing the linkage between national strategy, naval 
doctrine, and ship design was the genesis of this work. It is disappointing not 
to have that intriguing suggestion fulfilled more adequately. 
The book is distinguished by the fine black and white pictures and line 
drawings of all the destroyer types discussed. They are presented 
appropriately supporting the text, and help to enliven the book and provide a 
pictorial continuity. 
As a former program manager of the Spruance and Virginia classes, I can 
attest to the great value of this book to anyone moving new into the area of 
• Admiral Weschlcr was rhe DX/DXG Program Coordinator and a Director of
OP36 (Ship Characteristics Board). 
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signature suppression. except with respect to DDG-51 and some pre­
WWII designs, though these have been continual considerations. 
It would have been good for the general reader to have been reminded 
that ship procurement is but one aspect of ship cost. The costs of operations 
and maintenance and those of manning equal or exceed those of 
procurement. Thus every ship is bought three times or more. This provides 
another perspective on such features as ease of maintenance, equipment 
reliability, manning, and full economy. In this regard, the author notes that 
the low efficiency of gas turbines was a consideration in earlier ship design. 
The g reat improvement in the FT4 and particularly in the LM2500 
(Spruance, Perry, and Ticonderoga classes) is not noted, though this was one of 
the major factors in their selection, once distillate fuel became standard in 
the Navy. 
Overall, though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an 
excellent reference work, topnotch fo r selected reading, and the only 
reasonable historical source or indoctrina tion medium for a line officer 
thrust into destroyer modification, procurement or design. 
------- ■-------
Bartell, Joyce J., ed. Th, Yankee M•riner 
•nd S,apower: America', Cha/lmge of
Ocean Spact, Los Angeles: University
of Southern California Press, 1982,
299pp. S20.00
Was there eve r a Yankee Mariner? If
so, is he still with us? And what are his 
prospects for the future? These questions: 
are the focus of this guide to the United 
States as a sea-faring nation. The book is 
about American sea power, as defined in 
the foreword by Dr. Don Walsh, o(Trieste 
fame1 as "the sum total of all uses made of 
the oceans: their living and non-Hving 
resources, the energy wrest ed from them, 
their use as avenues of transport, their 
value and potential for recreation, as well 
as the vital r ole they play in national 
defense.'' Walsh's is a theme much in 
vogue these days. sounded perhaps most 
forcefully by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei 
Gorshkov in his book, The Sea Power of the 
Stau, and highlighted by the perhaps 
concluded negotiations at the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
This book, like certain other recent 
efforts, has several objectives. First, it 
seeks to provide a history of the Ameri� 
can experience with the sea. Second, it 
intends a tour d 'horizon as to the tota) 
impact American sea power has h ad in 
the past and should have in the future. 
And, fina11y. it attempts to offer an 
understanding of the importance of the 
oceans for the future of the United 
St.:i:tes. The editor and authors make a 
valiant attempt, but fall short of cover­
ing these fields as completely as they 
desired. 
This result is predestined by the nature 
of the book i,self. It is a collection of 
papers presented at a conference held at 
the University of Southern California in 
March 1981, sponsored by the Center for 
the Study of the American Experience, 
the Annenberg School of Communica­
tions. Some of the monograp hs trace the 
development of the United States as a sea 
power from the histo rical point of view, 
while others describe specific ocean uses 
and the US prospects for future develop­
ments in those areas, The denouement is 
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thought better to avoid those problem, 
that would arise as a result of seeking to 
alter the ABM Treaty. Arms negotia­
tions will always constitute only one 
dimension of the broader Soviet-Ameri­
can relationship, but will be bound to be 
affected by others. 0Linkage .. is also a 
problem for arms control negotiations 
within the Western alliance, where the 
stakes are now very high. 
There lS therefore a political impera­
tive for the United States to continue the 
talb, making progress as circumstances 
permit; but it is essential to embed the 
Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, as 
soon as possible, in the broader context 
of negotiations about all strategic forces, 
The problem of the latter, unfortunately, 
is complicated by the "messy institu­
tional infrastructure., of arms control 
and the increasingly comp!icated polit­
ical setting. As a result, .. it is not easy to 
de?lne a coherent, constructive, and 
politically sustain able arms control 
policy." 
Even so, it is argued that there is 
nothing to gain from terminating SALT 
ll. Beyond that the Study Group believes
that there might be room for less formal
and less public arrangements when it
comes to the long�term future of stra­
tegic arms control negotiations, while
unilateral efforts could be taken in the
defense field which would further the
basic aims of arms control. General
expectations about arms control should
be lowered, Its future is not primarily
hampered by "a lack of reasonable goals
or of potentially effective means of
accomplishing them." Basically, arms
control is "to a large degree hostage to
the srate of US-Soviet reJa.rions. • 1 
Overall, this is a sophisticated contri­
bution to the debate about the future of 
US strategic forces. it deserves to be 
read carefully and widely, and one looks 
forward to a similar venture into the 
area of conventional weapons. To at 
least one set of European eyes. the 
contributors to this voJume represent the 
acc eptable face of present-day 
American strategic thinking. 
KEN BOOTH 
University College of Walei, 
Aberystwyth 
Feld, Werner J. and Wildgen, John K. 
NA TO and the Atlantic Defe•se: Percep· 
ti't:ms and !Uusions, New York: Praeger, 
1982, 171pp. $19.95 
What is one to make of a book that 
confesses in the HAcknowledgements,'' 
before one has even seen the table of 
contents, that "This text was written 
quickly · .. , . "; that begins the last 
chapter, called "Policy Implications," 
by raising doubts" , . , with respect to 
the cau sality between perceptlons, 
attitudes 1 behavior and policy actions" 
after leading us down the garden path 
from the analysis of perceptions and 
illusions in the first five chapters to the 
policy implications of the last chapter; 
that fills page after page with dearly 
superfluous charts 1 graphs and even an 
entire irrelevant chapter? One wonders 
why the authors wrote it and why we 
should read it. Where were the friendly 
colleague, who help authors through 
early drafts and the professional editors 
with their blue pencils? 
The authors wrote a good article that 
was stretched into a bad book. The good 
article is the last and sixth chapter. It 
shows flashes of insight into some of the 
issues separating the United States from 
its European allies, but it is unfortunate 
that the best writing and most intelligent 
commentary concentrated in the last 
chapter highlight the bad writing, the 
lack of organization and the questionable 
methods of the rest of the book. Chapter 
six relies upon traditional analysis and 
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published in January 1968 in support of 
hls arguments that the Soviets view a 
protracted conventional campaign as 
improbable. Without doubt, at the time 
the Soviets did not focus on the possibil­
ities of a protracted conventional war. 
Many analysts would argue, however, 
that they do so today. Similarly, Miller 
argues that the Soviets expect to launch 
a preemptive nuclear strike, on the 
basis of a comment by A.A. Sidorenko 
published some years ago. Brezhnev's 
110-first-use offer has, of course,
overtaken Miller's argument, at ]east at
its face value.
The polnr of the$c criticisms is not to 
devalue MHler•s effort. His research is 
indeed painstaking, even if the book 
suffers from a variety of minor factual 
errors and some poor proofreading. 
Furthermore. Miller's arguments are 
plausible, and arc supportable on the 
basis of analyses that go beyond his 
methodology, Most readers will recog­
nize the limitations to Miller's method­
ology, as the author himself adrnowl­
cdges. Thus, for the general reader 
wHling to plunge into heavily academic 
prose, and for the speciali:H seeking a 
well-organized discussion of the Soviet 
military/political psyche, Miller', 
book, in the genre of the seminal works 
by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and 
Amoretta M. Hoeber, is indeed re­
quired reading, 
DOV S, ZAKHElM 
SpN'i,11 A��istant to the 
Under t;;rcrt·tary of Defense 
for Polky 
Clawson, Robert W. and Kaplan, 
Lawrence S,, eds, The Warsaw Part: 
Poli1ical P11rposr awl Miliwry .Means. 
W ilmington, Del.: Scharlarly Re­
sources, 1982. 297pp. $19.95 paper 
$9.95 
This collection of conference papers, 
produced under the auspices of Kent 
Professional Reading 121 
State University's Center for Nato 
Studies, goes some distance toward 
achieving its ambitious goal: to dose the 
"scholarly publication gap" that exisn 
between works on the Warsaw Pact and 
those dealing with Nato. [t could have 
succeeded with a somewhat shorter 
volume, however; one that wa:s: both 
more readable and less repetitious. 
Tl1e Warsaw Pr1C1 is organized as an 
encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact, Its 
major sections address "The Principal 
Political Relationships," 'jNATO and 
the Warsaw Pact/' "The Forces/' "The 
Weapons," and "Doctrine and Capabil­
ities," The initial section subjects the 
reader to che same Htany of dates and key 
events three times over, in Andrzej 
Korbonski 's essay pretentiously entitled 
"The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty­
FJve Years: An Entangling Alliance or an 
Empty Shell?",Jorg K. Hoensch's "The 
Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member 
States," and Edgar O'Ballance's "The 
Three Southern Members of the Warsaw 
Pact." 
O'Rallancc has produce{I the most 
cogent of the three pieces. It is relatively 
free of unsupported assertions, which 
particularly plague the Hoensch essay, 
and provides valuable insights into the 
neutralist tendencies of the southern tier 
states. Sloppiness even creeps into 
O'Ballance's work, however. For 
example, there was no June 197:3 Middle 
East War. The war in question was 
fought In June 1967. More troubling is 
the reference to participation of under­
strength Hun garian f orces and an 
"ineffectual" Bulgarian contingent in 
the crushing of Czechoslovakia. Hoemch 
asserts that "the Pact command 
could , pride itself on the mainly 
s;1tisfactory coordination o( the five partic� 
ipant forces during the . , the interven­
tion against a deviant Pact member." 
The scctiou on Nato and the Warsaw 
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